Tuesday, March 8, 2011

The Annoying, Barking Mad Genius of Morgan Warstler

As many who read this blog (if any section of this blog's readership can be usefully called "many") probably already know, there is a person out in Internet-land who calls himself Morgan Warstler.

He's a blogger for the odd, ugly, and mostly useless righty politics site Big Government (full name: "Andrew Breitbart presents Big Government featuring editor in chief Mike Flynn," and no I am not making that up). He's a gadfly on several well-known economics blogs including Scott Sumner's The Money Illusion, but most of my dealings with him have been at Yglesias' place over at ThinkProgress.

All in all, the guy is a nutcase, and I really don't recommend listening to him, reading him, or talking to him at all. It will just make you angry and confused.

That said, the Warstler may well be a genius. He's fallen in with the wrong people and has couched his policy recommendations in politically toxic, morally bankrupt packages. But the man is onto something.

I know, I know. Forty-two loyal Yglesias fans (the entire readership of this blog, sadly) just threw up a little in their mouths.

But Morgan's Guaranteed Income plan is sort of on to something. I'll explain later. Just wanted to warn you, sort of an econ version of the "trigger warnings" on sites that focus on social issues. I will be taking up a lukewarm defense of Warstler this week. Consider yourself on notice.

Back from Vacation: Theory vs Fact

One very strange* and ubiquitous problem in economics is people's tenndency to skip over operational fact on their way to making their theoretical analysis.

Take by analogy this account of my trip home from my parents' house this afternoon.

I was driving home from my parents' house this afternoon and I was pulled over by a police officer and given a ticket. (Thankfully this last bit did not actually happen. At least, it did not happen today.)

The ticket was for speeding. I will now have to appear in court or pay a fine.

All these things are observations that illustrate operational facts about the relationship between a certain member of the public (me) and certain institutions of government.

If a police officer sees me driving over a certain speed, she will stop me and give me a ticket that will result in my having certain liabilities toward the government.

I may try to come up with some ideas, based on my experience, how I can avoid getting a ticket in the future. Any such analysis should be based on the operational facts above. If I am unaware as to the operational reason I incurred these liabilities I will be in trouble.

What does this have to do with macroeconomics? Well, a commentator on Yglesias' blog called halfkidding said recently:


So-called monetary policy with all its tools and mechanisms is used to do one thing. That is to increase or decrease the amount of credit in the system.


It's fine to believe, as many fine economists do, the theoretical assertion that monetary policy can increase or decrease the amount of credit in the banking system. However, it's crucial to retain the knowledge that in operational fact what the central bank is doing is setting the interest rate. There are various theoretical mechanisms by which this can increase or decrease the amount of lending in the system, but the magic Fed lever controls the PRICE of funds, not the AMOUNT of funds.

As a matter of operational fact banks determine the amount of credit (thus money) in the system by their lending decisions, which are influenced by the prevailing interest rate but also by the availability of creditworthy borrowers.

*At least I think it's strange. Researchers of other disciplines could probably say better than I can.

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Innes: What is Money?

studentee pointed out in comments that Innes' "What is Money?" is a good introduction to these ideas and his articles on the topic are the foundation for much of modern thinking about currency.

Worth reading if you can get past the density of the prose.

Saturday, March 5, 2011

The Origins of Money

The conception of the origin of money I alluded to in my earlier post about liberalism is not, of course, the one with which most people are familiar.

In the standard telling, originally people used a barter economy, where (to oversimplify the story a bit) a chicken farmer would carry some eggs to market and exchange them for other things he needed, like sugar or flour.

Eventually certain commodities, especially precious metals but also fishhooks and other oddities, became accepted as the standard medium of exchange, leading eventually to paper currency that was "backed" by some commodity.

It's not clear exactly who originated this story, but it's been disproven for some time by anthropological research. The details of the story are interesting (if you like that sort of thing) but kind of involved, so if you really want to know the ins and outs of how money originated you can check out L Randall Wray's Understanding Modern Money. Thankfully the relevant portion is currently available on Google Books' preview so you can read it without finding a copy of the book.

The key point, though, is that money never really derived its value from any commodity, and did not evolve as a lubricant to the barter system (which never really existed.) Attempts have been made from time to time to peg the value of a currency to the price of a certain commodity (especially gold) but the value of money comes from its status as TWINTOPT - That Which Is Needed To Pay Taxes.

Friday, March 4, 2011

Money, Taxes, and Property Rights

This post over at Bleeding Heart Libertarians got me thinking about the monetary system (surprise!) and the fact that while I don't really care that much about these meta-theory type questions ("are you a classical liberal or a high liberal?") I'm glad people are out there writing about them because it can really give you some useful terminology and frameworks for thinking about things in a straightforward way.

For example, Brennan explains that


One way to distinguish among kinds of liberalism is by their differing conceptions of economic liberty. Classical liberals and libertarians affirm what we might call a thick conception of economic liberty; high liberals, a thin conception.


Brennan goes on to explain what these terms mean, and it's interesting, but what jumps out at me even at this early point in his discussion is the way this question about the character and importance of economic liberty relates to the battle lines that get drawn in real-world political fights over economic policy.

According to anthropologic research (much of it done in France) the human monetary system was conceived as a response to a specific situation - an entrenched overclass who participated in a "gift economy" that was closed to the majority of the population (the underclass.)

The government (this was at the dawn of democracy) created a system by which they would pay out tokens to the population and levy a tax on real property, compelling the owners of the real property to participate in the private economy in order to acquire these coins.

Thus money became was a way for the people to compel the property-owning overclass to employ their considerable resources (chiefly land and the associated raw materials) to produce value not only for themselves and their friends but also for the benefit of the public at large.

Now, this development was not welcomed by the overclass by any means, but it was such an ingenious system that it stuck around (with some hiccups over the centuries, to be sure) to the present day.

Thus we would expect libertarianism, accurately characterized in Brennan's excellent post as being close to absolutist in its conception of individual property rights, to be hostile to the very idea of the human monetary system wherein the government levies taxes on property in an effort to compel property owners to produce value towards the public good.

Despite libertarian claims to love "the free market" we see libertarianism's true colors in the foundational myth of modern libertarianism, "Atlas Shrugged."

John Galt objects to the very idea that he should be compelled to use his property for the public good. In the myth he is attacked for "producing too much" but of course the underlying philosophy (also reflected in Heinlein's seminal libertarian/militarist fantasy "The Moon is a Harsh Mistress") clearly abhors the fact that the world's Atlases are being forced to produce value for the undeserving masses.

The reason the system persists is that while rightists love to rhetorically conflate taxation with the stealing of physical property, in actual practice property owners who would never tolerate having their physical property seized by the government will in fact submit willingly to turning over some government tokens a few times a year in exchange for the right to go on being wealthy property owners.

Thus what the overclass is left with is to do their best to install people sympathetic to their interests at the levers of power, so that the system can be tuned to allow them the maximum advantage despite the persistence of the basic structure that forces them to produce for the public good. In a democracy, of course, this tends to work only in fits and starts, since politicians who prevent the system from working properly tend to get voted out of office.

It's a fascinating and elegant design, at least compared to the available alternatives. Not perfect by any means, but at least we can agree preferable to the lot of an ancient Greek slave or a Medieval serf.

For some reason the discourse on liberalism reminded me of my favorite quote from Machiavelli:

"It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. The innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new."

With that I'll leave you alone. G'night.

Straight Talk on the Rumble in the Jungle!

Two things I can't resist are political philosophy and Muhammad Ali. Today Ezra Klein comes through with two great tastes that go great together!

The post is about the silliness of political conspiracy theories that require extraordinary planning and crisp execution - anyone who works in government knows that these things are basically impossible when the group of "conspirators" grows beyond about four people.

But the part that caught my eye was Klein's highlighting of something George Foreman said about Ali's famous "Rope-a-Dope" strategy in the Rumble in the Jungle. Foreman apparently said "that Muhammad Ali had fired an arrow into a barn and then walked over afterward and painted a bull's-eye around it."

I haven't read that particular Foreman quote, but I know from other sources it's correct. Ali's strategy of sitting on the ropes waiting for Foreman to punch himself out was not something he came into the fight with; it was a strategy that evolved after Ali was unable to evade Foreman in the first two rounds due to Foreman's excellent footwork and the unexpectedly soft ring canvas (which degraged Ali's footspeed.)

Because Ali won the early rounds, and controlled the fight from then on, it's generally assumed that it was all part of some big grand plan. However, in reality Ali realized that despite having won the first few rounds, he was putting himself in harm's way too much and was likely to get knocked out once he became too tired to dance around.

In the third round he noticed that when Foreman had him on the ropes he was throwing wild punches and missing a lot. Ali decided to stay on the ropes and see if Foreman would continue making mistakes and tiring himself out unnecessarily. It worked.

This is a crucial corrolary to Klein's point about how we sometimes assume our opponents are ruthless, unstoppable and efficient. In fact you must always be alert to the potential that your opponent is making a mistake. Most victories are the result of realizing when an opponent's plan is a mistake, and then letting him execute that plan.

Joe Frazier, sitting at ringside, recognized what was going on. At the end of the third round he lamented "George is rushing himself too much... he's not being calm." Five rounds later, Foreman ran out of gas and got knocked out. Not because Ali had a master plan, but because he recognized that Foreman's plan couldn't work, and stood around while George beat himself.

Killing the Recovery

Mark Thoma at Economist's View highlights today's Paul Krugman column in the NYT called "How to Kill a Recovery."

Here's the bit that scares me:


Of course, Republicans believe, or at least pretend to believe, that the direct job-destroying effects of their proposals would be more than offset by a rise in business confidence. As I like to put it, they believe that the Confidence Fairy will make everything all right.


This type of pre-Machiavellian superstitious thinking is exactly what led the British to institute austerity measures, and the results were disastrous. Business confidence is a function of economic conditions, not of politicians projecting certain classical values like prudence or responsibility in some abstract sense.

Unfortunately Republicans are in control of the House, so they're likely to get their way on some of this stuff. But Obama should not be out in public conceding the argument that we have to cut the budget and reduce the deficit. The right way to reduce the medium-term deficit is to spend much more - disburse funds to the states on a per capita basis to allow them to close their budget gaps without laying off workers, and to institute a federal hiring program to employ workers who are willing and able to work but not able to find work.